s which is not one of essen
tial nature the basis for differentiating so prominently these methods of research. In the third section, which Michael Kors treats of the nature of thought, or the general theory of logic, the author's point of view is in its essential features quite in accord with that of Bosanquet. Professor Creighton insists upon the conception of thought as a living, growing phenomenon, and not a mere mechanical grouping of ready-made ideas, and also that the growth of thought is to [http://michael-kors2013.webs.com/ michael-kors2013.webs.com] be regarded as a process of development which proceeds ever from simpler to more complex states, according to the manner of all evolutionary processes. He regards the judgment as the unit of thought, and defines the concept as ' the series of judgments which have already been made.' * By way of comment upon this definition of concept, he adds that " to make the thought our own, to gain the real concept, it is necessary to draw out or realize to ourselves the actual set of judgments for which the word is but the shorthand expression."8 The concept, however, is not merely a summation of a number of judgments. It is rather a blending of the various elements which the several judgments have furnished in such a way that these judgments which have been operative in the formation of the concept are implicitly rather than explicitly apprehended. For there is such a thing as an implicit apprehension of the significance of a whole without a c**cious analysis of its component parts, as Mr. Stout has so admirably set forth in his Analytic Psychology. The function of the concept is essentially 'adjectival' until it is subjected to an analysis which discloses explicitly the parts which form the ■ actual set of judgments' but which before such analysis were discerned implicity. Professor Creighton has stoutly defended the necessity of a uni versal [http://michael-kors2013.webs.com/ Michael Kors Outlet] element in some form or other as the ground of inference. In this view he takes exception to Mill's contention that reasoning is from particular to particular. The author very happily sums up the argument in support of his position in the following sentences, which clearly indicate his general point of view as regards the theory of inference: "Knowledge sees the universal in the particular, or reads the particular as a case of [http://www.michaelkorsoutlet2013.webeden.co.uk/ Michael Kors Outlet] the universal. And when thus interpreted the particular ceases to be a bare particular and becomes an individual with a permanent nature of its own. When one reas** from an individual case, then it is the universal or typical nature, not the particular or momentary existence, upon which the inference proceeds. If there were any merely particular facts in knowledge we could never reason from them. But the so-called particular facts, as elements of knowledge, possess a universal or typical aspect in virtue of which alone inference is possible." * Princeton University. John Grier Hibben. U Education Rationelle de la Volonte: Son emploi th&rapeutique. Paul Emile Levy. Preface de M. le Dr. Bernheim. Paris, Alcan. 1898. Pp. v 234. Dr. Levy divides into tw

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